Iraq

Mardi 4 novembre 2008 2 04 /11 /2008 06:01

Archives 2006


British LibDem MP Norman Baker is now two months into a private, year-long investigation into the death of Dr David Kelly, the scientist who found himself under seige after apparently accusing the government of ‘sexing up’ the case for war to a BBC journalist. The Hutton Inquiry, framed as a battle between the government and the BBC, failed to probe the manner in which Dr Kelly met his death.

Suicide was largely assumed, but the blunt gardening knife found at the scene, the fact that only a single ulnar artery was transected, the lack of blood splattering, and the tiny amount of co-proxamol residue found in Dr Kelly’s stomach, points up the need for closer scrutiny. In a debut TV appearance on the subject - GMTV’s ‘The Sunday Programme’ - Mr Baker invited those with relevant information to contact him. He will be producing a report or book on his findings next year, but his stated aim is to above all arrive at the truth.

3 juil. 2006


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Lundi 27 octobre 2008 1 27 /10 /2008 02:23
 
Ritter Frmr. UN Weapons Inspector. His commen...
Scott Ritter Frmr. UN Weapons Inspector.

His commentary on Hillary Clinton includes:
http://www.alternet.org/story/48729

Communauté : Actualités Internationales - Publié dans : Iraq
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Dimanche 26 octobre 2008 7 26 /10 /2008 22:03

http://www.mediaed.org

Ritter is noted for his role as a chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, and later for his criticism of United States foreign policy in the Middle East. Prior to the US invasion of Iraq in March, 2003, Ritter publicly argued that Iraq possessed no significant weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). He became a popular anti-war figure and talk show commentator as a result of his stance.

description courtesy of wikipedia.





Communauté : Actualités Internationales - Publié dans : Iraq
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Dimanche 12 octobre 2008 7 12 /10 /2008 16:42

L'Orient le Jour

L’Église chaldéenne dénonce la violence « orchestrée » contre ses fidèles et demande au gouvernement de tenir ses engagements de protéger cette communauté.



« Nous sommes la cible d’une campagne de liquidation, une campagne de violences aux objectifs politiques », a déclaré Mgr Louis Sako, l’archevêque chaldéen de Kirkouk (Nord), dans un entretien à l’AFP. Il a une nouvelle fois dénoncé « la continuation des attaques et des agressions contre les chrétiens, surtout à Mossoul », capitale de la province de Ninive à 370 km au nord de Bagdad, et historiquement l’un des berceaux des chrétiens irakiens. Selon des sources au sein du clergé local, six chrétiens ont été tués la semaine dernière à Mossoul, aujourd’hui dernier bastion urbain de la branche irakienne d’el-Qaëda. En février 2008, l’archevêque chaldéen de Mossoul, Mgr Faraj Rahou, y avait été kidnappé et retrouvé mort quelques semaines plus tard. Sa mort avait suscité la réprobation internationale et le Premier ministre irakien Nouri al-Maliki s’était alors engagé à protéger la communauté chrétienne. « Ces attaques ne sont pas les premières et ne seront malheureusement pas les dernières », a déploré Mgr Sako.

« Ceux qui nous visent cherchent à en tirer un avantage politique : soit en poussant les chrétiens à quitter le pays, soit pour les forcer à s’allier avec des groupes dont nous refusons les projets », a estimé le prélat. « Je n’exclus pas que nous soyons les victimes d’un plan à la fois régional et interne, la situation est tellement compliquée et mêlée dans un Irak transformé en champ de bataille », a-t-il analysé. « Nous avons entendu beaucoup de paroles du Premier ministre Maliki, mais cela ne s’est malheureusement pas traduit dans les faits », selon Mgr Sako.

« Nous continuons d’être visés, nous voulons des solutions, pas des promesses », a-t-il souligné.
Les chaldéens, des catholiques de rite oriental, constituent la principale communauté chrétienne du pays, et l’une des plus anciennes églises chrétiennes. Selon Mgr Sako, le nombre de chrétiens en Irak avant l’invasion américaine de mars 2003 tournait autour de 800 000. Depuis lors, presque 250 000 ont quitté le pays. En cinq ans, près de 200 membres de cette communauté ont été tués, et environ 200 attaques ont été perpétrées contre des églises ou des chrétiens, essentiellement à Bagdad, Mossoul et Kirkouk (255 km au nord de Bagdad), a précisé l’archevêque.

« Les chrétiens d’Irak n’ont pas de milices ou tribus pour les défendre. Nous avons un sentiment amer d’injustice, car des innocents sont tués et on ne sait pas pourquoi », a-t-il ajouté. « Nous ne sommes pas capables de former une force de protection, et cela ne résoudra pas le problème et risque au contraire de compliquer la situation », a expliqué Mgr Sako, qui a demandé à ses coreligionnaires de « ne pas céder aux forces du mal et de l’obscurantisme ».

L’archevêque de Kirkouk a également appelé les chrétiens « à rester attachés à leur patrie et à leur statut sur cette terre qui est la leur ». Il a enfin rappelé « les Américains, qui occupent notre pays, à leur responsabilité de protéger les Irakiens ».


http://www.lorient-lejour.com.lb/page.aspx?page=article&id=383267
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Vendredi 10 octobre 2008 5 10 /10 /2008 18:01

CounterPunch Weekend Edition
October 10 / 12, 2008


Corruption and Dirty Water


A
deadly outbreak of cholera in Iraq is being blamed on a scandal involving corrupt officials who failed to sterilize the local drinking water because they were bribed to buy chlorine from Iran that was long past its expiration date.


The centre of the epidemic is in Babil province, south of Baghdad, in the marshy lands east of the Euphrates river, not far from the ruins of ancient Babylon. In Baghdad, where half the six million population has no access to clean drinking water, people are now drinking only bottled or boiled water.


The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, has appointed a commission of inquiry to find out why ineffective chlorine was being used. He is also refusing to release three officials under arrest despite demands from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to which they are linked. In the town of al-Madhatiya, in southern Babil, a councillor involved in buying the chlorine was reportedly released after militiamen connected to ISCI intimidated police into freeing him.


The scandal over the contract is becoming a test case of the Maliki government's willingness to tackle the pervasive corruption in Iraq where officials see their jobs primarily as a way of enriching themselves through bribes. It is also a test of his ability to exercise central control over ISCI and parties which have been hitherto dominant outside Baghdad.


Cholera is endemic in Iraq but last year there was an epidemic in northern Iraq which was far more serious than anything seen for years. Some 4,700 people, mostly in Sulaimaniyah province, were stricken.

This year, the government hoped to stop another outbreak of the disease by repairing shattered water and sanitation stations and putting chlorine in the water supply. An Iraqi government official, who did not want his name published, said the Health Ministry bought $11m (£6.4m) worth of chlorine from Iran for use in the provinces of Babil, Diwaniyah and Kerbala, all on the Euphrates river south of Baghdad.


In the latter two provinces, officials noticed that the chlorine was old and the time during which it could be employed effectively had expired, and refused to use it. But in Babil the chlorine was put in the fresh water supply stations at al-Madhatiyah, al-Hashimiyah and al-Qasim, south-east of the provincial capital, al-Hillah. Soon 222 people were confirmed as having cholera in Babil, in a total of 420 cases of whom seven have died.


The scandal is a reflection of the the way Iraqi politics works. The ruling parties monopolize jobs and contracts. It is impossible to find work at any level in most ministries without a letter of commendation from one of the parties in the government. The enormous Iraqi government apparatus, employing some two million people, is a patronage machine. There are now more state officials than under Saddam, but it is unable to supply electricity, food rations and clean water, despite Iraq's $80bn in accumulated oil revenues.


The power base of ISCI, the most powerful Shia religious party, is the Shia provinces of southern Iraq between Baghdad and Basra. Political parties are expected to protect their members from arrest. This explains what happened next. The officials arrested in Babil belonged to the Badr Organization, the militia wing of ISCI. Leaders of the party demanded their release but Mr Maliki refused. Badr militants then turned up at a police station in al-Madhatiya and forced the police to release a councillor apparently involved in purchasing the chlorine.

But the grand Shia coalition which won more than half the seats in the Iraqi parliament in the last election in December 2005 has broken up. Mr Maliki is trying to build up his own Dawa party, using the resources of the state.


He has deepening differences with ISCI which won most of the southern Iraqi provinces. They accuse him of trying to create a power base in what was previously their territory by paying the tribes who belong to government-sponsored "support councils" in southern Iraq. His aim is to get his own candidates elected in the provincial and parliamentary elections next year. "These will be crucial in deciding who will hold power in Iraq in future," said one senior Iraqi official.

Control of oil revenues gives Mr Maliki a crucial card. Iraq has 50 to 60 per cent unemployment and most jobs are with the state. Salaries of state employees have risen sharply. But the government remains largely dysfunctional aside from its growing military strength. Iraqi journalists are encouraged and paid to write "good news" stories. In Baghdad, people notice there is little mention of the cholera in the media. This provokes fear that the epidemic may be worse than the government admits.

 

Patrick Cockburn is the the author of "Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq.

http://www.counterpunch.org/patrick10122008.html

Communauté : Actualités Internationales - Publié dans : Iraq
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Mercredi 8 octobre 2008 3 08 /10 /2008 14:30

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Mardi 7 octobre 2008 2 07 /10 /2008 21:43

Jon Snow examines the brutal reality of life inside post-invasion Iraq, meeting a variety of its citizens from victims of bomb blasts and war widows to human rights activists and politicians.
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles...


Part I

De : Tagemandbagem


Part II


Part III



Part IV



Part V



Part VI

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Mardi 7 octobre 2008 2 07 /10 /2008 14:30
LeGrandSoir

Quand est-ce qu’un Holocauste
n’est pas un Holocauste ?
 
Lorsque les coupables le qualifient de Victoire


Bien que "l’offensive" ait échoué en termes de politique, elle est devenue une victoire en termes de propagande. Il semblerait que les partisans de la guerre n’ont rien d’autre à nous offrir, alors ils en parlent, en parlent, et en parlent encore. Permettez-moi de vous parler de la réduction de la violence en Irak : son niveau actuel est tel que n’importe quelle autre société dans le monde trouverait la situation horrible et intolérable, y compris la société irakienne d’avant l’invasion et l’occupation US.

Sans oublier que, grâce à cette merveilleuse petite guerre, plus de la moitié de la population en Irak est soit morte, estropiée, traumatisée, confinée dans des prisons étatsuniennes et irakiennes surpeuplées, réfugiées à l’intérieur du pays ou en exil.


Ainsi, le nombre de personnes disponibles pour tuer ou être tuées a été remarquablement réduit.


De plus, un nettoyage ethnique à grande échelle a été effectué dans le pays (un autre indicateur de progrés, n’est-ce pas ? (*)). Sunnites et Chiites vivent plus que jamais chacun dans leurs propres enclaves et on ne voit plus d’horribles communautés mixtes avec leurs mariages mixtes, la violence sectaire a donc baissé ; et le puissant mouvement du leader Chiite Muqtada al-Sadr a décrété un cessez-le-feu depuis de nombreux mois, sans rapport avec l’offensive. Et pour combler le tout, les soldats US, face aux nombreux "explosifs improvisés" au bord des routes, sortent de moins en moins de leurs casernes (de peur de mourir, par exemple), et donc la violence contre nos braves gars a baissé aussi. Et n’oubliez pas que toute la violence en Irak a commencé lorsque les insurgés ont attaqué les forces US...


Imaginez que si la totalité de la population irakienne agée de plus de 10 ans ait été tuée, estropiée, emprisonnée ou forcée à l’exile, il n’y aurait probablement plus de violence du tout. Voilà ce qui serait une véritable victoire.


On ne devrait permettre à aucun étasunien d’oublier que la société irakienne a été détruite. Les habitants de cette terre malheureuse ont tout perdu - leurs maisons, leurs écoles, les quartiers, leurs mosquées, leurs emplois, leurs carrières, leurs techniciens, leur système de santé, leur système juridique, les droits des femmes, leur tolérance religieuse, leur sécurité, leur passé, leur présent, leur avenir, leurs vies.


Mais heureusement, il leur reste l’offensive .


William BLUM

(*) en français dans le texte

Le site de William Blum www.killinghope.org


http://www.legrandsoir.info/spip.php?article7212


Communauté : Actualités Internationales - Publié dans : Iraq
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Vendredi 1 août 2008 5 01 /08 /2008 12:20
Mondialisation.ca, Le 22 juillet 2008

 



Les guerres d’occupation de l’Afghanistan et de l’Irak se poursuivent avec leurs cortèges de morts et leurs lots de destruction et de désolation. Elles continuent et sont livrées de plus en plus dans l’indifférence générale. Jour après jour, les dépêches en provenance de Kaboul, de Kandahar ou de Bagdad font état des attentats suicides, des attentats à la voiture piégée, d’affrontements sanglants et de bombardements de villes et de villages. Sept ans de guerre en Afghanistan. Cinq ans de guerre en Irak. Les bilans présentés font peu état des dommages aux infrastructures et dressent une comptabilité imprécise des victimes. Quel gâchis! Quel massacre! Combien d’appréhensions, de peurs et de souffrances endurées par des millions d’habitants? Aucune volonté réelle ne se manifeste pour y mettre fin. Et pourtant ce sont des guerres qui affectent le monde entier.

 

En ce 13 juillet 2008, encore une dépêche en provenance de Kaboul qui nous informe de la mort de plusieurs personnes que l’on prend soin de trier en cinq catégories: les soldats de la Force internationale d’assistance à la sécurité (FIAS ou ISAF) de l’OTAN, les soldats de l’armée afghane, les soldats de la coalition internationale sous commandement américain, les insurgés et la population civile. Les victimes des trois premières catégories semblent comptabilisées et pour les autres la formule habituelle est de mise: «Bien qu'aucun bilan final n'ait pu être établi, les insurgés ont probablement subi de lourdes pertes» (cyberpresse).

 

Dans ces conditions, il n’est pas étonnant que le bilan des morts, des blessés, des victimes et des déplacés causés par ces guerres d’invasion depuis leur déclenchement ne soit pas connu et peu rapporté. Et il l’est de moins en moins pour en occulter, aux yeux du public, les conséquences tragiques pour les peuples qui en sont les victimes. Lors de la Guerre du Golfe on avait vite compris que le taux d’acceptation des guerres est proportionnel à celui de l’ignorance que l’on en a. Et c’est l’approche qui est privilégiée depuis.


Le palmarès de victimes anonymes

 

Jusqu’à maintenant, la nationalité des soldats tués ou blessés était rapportée dans la nouvelle. Maintenant, ils font partie d’une statistique plus globale qui les prive, après leur décès de leur identité. Ce ne seront désormais que des chiffres selon une décision rendue par l’Isaf et ce sera au pays d’origine du soldat de transmettre cette information: « L’Isaf, qui comprend des soldats de 40 nations, n'a révélé ni l'identité, ni la nationalité des victimes, elle en laisse systématiquement le soin aux autorités des pays d'origine»  (cyberpresse); ainsi, l’on pourra en retarder la divulgation, ce qui permettra de minimiser l’importance de chaque épisode et le tout viendra se perdre dans les colonnes statistiques, ce qui aura pour effet de contribuer à la banalisation de la guerre et ainsi à sa plus grande acceptation par le public.

 

En bref, le bilan global des victimes de ces guerres ne fait pas l’objet d’une grande diffusion. Il semble, avec le temps, devenir en soi l’objet d’un rapport comme un autre. L’indignation n’est plus au rendez-vous ni même la consternation ou la tristesse. Il se présente plutôt un sentiment d’indifférence qui laisse la place aux questions de stratégies sur le terrain et à celles relatives aux conditions qui permettront de «gagner» la guerre avant d’effectuer un retrait dit progressif.

 

  Quel bilan peut-on dresser en juillet 2008?

 

Un très grand nombre d’organismes veillent sur cet aspect des conflits armés et, notamment, les organisations internationales des droits humains telles que Human Rights Watch, Amnistie Internationale, Human Rights for Change, Afghanistan Justice Project, War Victims Monitor et International Center for Transitional Justice.. Quel est le décompte? Quel est le nombre de déplacés dans les pays théâtres de ces guerres et vers l’étranger? Quelle est l’ampleur des dégâts et des coûts financiers entraînés par ces deux «opérations»?

 

Nous présentons, ici, un bilan de ces guerres afin de pouvoir en prendre toute la mesure et de mieux comprendre le sens des décisions politiques et militaires qui sont prises par les forces d’occupation. Les données présentées doivent être considérées comme étant des approximations peu importe la source d’où elles proviennent. Nous ferons état des bilans officiels, mais nous considérerons avec beaucoup d’attention les rapports provenant d’organismes reconnus comme indépendants. Nous présentons un bilan succinct des victimes et les coûts globaux de ces guerres.

 

Des bilans indépendants

 

Selon  Unknown News, en date du 16 juillet 2007, la situation globale se présentait ainsi: Au moins 832 962 personnes ont été tuées et 1 590 895 ont été blessés en Afghanistan et en Irak (Unknown news).

 

En Afghanistan

 

Selon le dossier concernant les victimes civiles de Marc W. Herold de l’Université du New Hampshire les bombardements américains ont tué, entre 3 485 et 4 034 civils entre octobre 2001 et juin 2004 (http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/ ).

 

Selon des données rapportées par Matrix Masters, un total estimé de 1 500 personnes ont été tuées en 2005 dans ce pays (matrixmasters.com). Quelques 600 policiers auraient été tués entre l’élection de Hamid Karzai en décembre 2004 et la mi-mai 2005 (Wikipedia).

 

Selon un rapport d’Human Rights Watch, en 2006, 4 400 Afghans ont été tués dont 1000 civils. De plus, un total de 2 077 insurgés ont péri dans les opérations conduites par les forces de la coalition entre le 1er septembre et le 13 décembre 2006. Pour la même période, les données rapportées par Associated Press basées sur les rapports du gouvernement afghan, de l’OTAN et des représentants de la coalition font état d’un total inférieur à 4 000 morts, la plupart d’entre eux étant des insurgés. Plus de 1 900 personnes avaient été tuées au cours des huit premiers mois de l’année (Wikipedia).

 

En 2007, on estime que 7 100 personnes ont été tuées y compris 926 policiers afghans, 4 478 insurgés, 1 500 civils et 232 soldats étrangers (Wikipedia).

 

En mars 2008, après plus de six ans de combat, selon les données de l’Aghanistan Conflict Monitor se référant à un article de M. Weaver du Guardian, le total de ceux qui ont péri dans cette guerre dépasse les 8 000 personnes en 2007 (M. Weaver, The Guardian, 11 mars 2008) lequel se base sur les données d’un rapport produit par les Nations Unies: «Les Nations Unies ont brossé une évaluation sombre du conflit en Afghanistan, en faisant état du fait que la violence s’est intensifiée considérablement au cours de la dernière année, ce qui a entraîné la mort de plus de 8 000 personnes y compris au moins 1 500 civils» (M. Weaver, 2008) (Afghan conflict monitor).

 

Au cours des six premiers mois de 2008, plus de 2 100 personnes ont été tuées y compris 698 civils, 502 insurgés (jusqu’au 14 mars). En juin seulement, 613 personnes sont mortes dans des actes de violence causés par les insurgés y compris 473 insurgés, 34 civils et 44 membres des forces de sécurité afghans. 72 policiers afghans ont été tués au cours du mois d’avril (Wikipedia).

 

Les Nations Unies ont rapporté en juin 2008 que près de 700 civils afghans avaient été tués depuis le début de l’année dont les deux tiers étaient dus à des attaques perpétrées par les insurgés et 255 dans des opérations militaires (Wikipedia).

 

Selon ces données approximatives il est permis d’avoir un aperçu de l’ampleur du nombre de personnes tuées dans cette guerre, mais elles ne peuvent traduire l’importance des effectifs de population affectés, car il ne s’agit pas d’une simple occupation militaire, mais d’une guerre totale. Nous aurions donc un total estimé entre 20 000 et 25 000 personnes qui ont perdu la vie en Afghanistan entre octobre 2001 et juin 2008.

 

En Irak

 

Selon Adlène Meddi du Quotidien indépendant El Watan, en date du 25 mars 2008,  «si le bilan opérationnel officiel de l’armée américaine en Irak a atteint le seuil symbolique de 4000 morts avec les récentes attaques, l’on est incapable de préciser le nombre des civils irakiens tués dans cette guerre qui dure depuis cinq sanglantes années» (El Watan).

 

Selon cet auteur, «des chercheurs américains de l’Université John Hopkins (Baltimore) et iraquiens, de l’Université Al Mustansiriya (Bagdad), ont estimé la surmortalité depuis l’invasion de l’Irak, de mars 2003 jusqu’à juillet 2006».

 

«Ils estiment à 655.000 le nombre de morts supplémentaires d’Iraquiens (soit 2,5% de la population) par rapport à la période antérieure à l'invasion américaine. Le taux de mortalité était de 5,5 pour mille avant mars 2003 contre 13,3 pour mille désormais...».

 

«Ces travaux, publiés dans la revue médicale The Lancet, n’ont pas compté les corps à la morgue pour calculer la surmortalité. Ils ont enquêté auprès de 47 ensembles, répartis sur tout le territoire, contenant chacun 40 foyers. Ils ont recensé le nombre de naissances et de décès par foyer entre 2001 et 2006 et ont ensuite extrapolé les résultats à l’ensemble de la population iraquienne...».

 

«Ces chiffres sont très loin des chiffres officiels publiés sur iraqbodycount.org, site qui est censé recenser les civils tués au cours des interventions militaires en Irak (qui avaient été répertoriés jusqu’à ce moment-là)  "que" 45 à 50.000 victimes...» En juillet 2008, selon les données fournies par ce projet le total des morts se situe entre 86 017 et 93 936 (http://www.iraqbodycount.org/).

 

Des coûts astronomiques

 

Combien ces guerres ont-elles coûté jusqu’à maintenant? Quelle est l’ampleur des dommages causés aux infrastructures? Quels seraient les coûts globaux de leur reconsctruction?

 

Selon un rapport du Service de recherche du Congrès des États-Unis mis à jour le 23 juin 2008, jusqu’au 26 décembre 2007 le Congrès a approuvé la somme totale de 700 milliards de dollars pour les opérations militaires, la sécurité, la reconstruction, l’aide internationale, les dépenses des ambassades et les frais d’assurances et les soins de santé pour les anciens combattants pour les trois opérations initiées depuis les attaques du 11 septembre.

 

Selon la même source de renseignements, en date du 19 juin 2008, la Chambre a approuvé une nouvelle version du Rapport à la Chambre 2642, un supplément pour l’année fiscale 2008, qui devait être examiné par le Sénat la semaine suivante. Ce projet de loi comprend une somme de 163 milliards de dollars pour les deux années fiscales 2008 et 2009... Si le tout est approuvé, le Service de recherche du Congrès estime que le financement des guerres contre la terreur atteindra le total de 857 milliards de dollars, soit un total de 656 milliards de dollars pour la guerre en Irak, 173 milliards de dollars pour celle de l’Afghanistan et de 29 milliards de dollars pour le renforcement de la sécurité (Belasco, A., 2008).

 

Selon W. T. Wheeler, le Département de la Défense a témoigné devant le Congrès le 31 juillet 2007 que la guerre en Afghanistan avait coûté la somme de 78.1 milliards de dollars (Counterpunch).

 

Dans la première année de guerre en Afghanistan, selon les propos de EuropUSA.com, «sans parler des vies humaines perdues du fait de la guerre qu’on ne peut bien entendu pas chiffrer, le coût financier de la guerre en Afghanistan s’éleverait à $1 milliard par mois. Avec l’avancée spectaculaire de l’Alliance du Nord et la prise de Kaboul, on imagine que ce coût astronomique va bientôt se réduire… Les États-Unis ont déjà envoyé 6000 missiles et bombes sur le sol afghan. Le coût de certains missiles s’élève à $1 million pièce. Attention à ne pas se tromper de cible !. Les 50.000 militaires américains basés en Asie touchent en guise de motivation $150 par mois…et la gloire en plus bien sûr. Autre chiffre « étonnant » : le coût par heure des avions de combat. Par exemple, les F14 coûte $5000 par heure. Personne ne gagne à faire la guerre sauf peut-être l’industrie militaire…»(Europusa.com).

 

Selon les données du National Priorities Project, si toutes les demandes additionnelles sont approuvées par le Congrès le coût de la guerre en Iraq atteindrait, pour le budget étatsunien, à la fin de l’année fiscale 2008, la somme totale de 611 milliards de dollars (National Priorities.org).

 

Pour voir le budget autorisé pour la guerre en Irak (en milliards de dollars), cliquez ici.

 

  

Selon d’autres sources d’information, les coûts réels pourraient atteindre les 3 000 milliards de dollars pour le budget national des États-Unis. Selon Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes du Journal The Times, en tenant compte des opérations elles-mêmes et des impacts directs de ces guerres sur l’ensemble de l’économie, les coûts des conflits en Irak et en Afghanistan ont pris des proportions fulgurantes et ils les estiment à la somme totale de 3 000 milliards de dollars. Ils concluent ainsi: «Par un brassage malsain de fonds d’urgence, par une série de livres comptables et par des calculs sous-estimés constants des ressources nécessaires à la poursuite de la guerre, nous avons essayé d’identifier combien nous avons dépensé – et combien nous devrons probablement dépenser jusqu’à la fin. Le chiffre auquel nous arrivons correspond à la somme de 3 000 milliards de dollars. Nos calculs sont basés sur des hypothèses conservatrices. Ces calculs sont simples en eux-mêmes, même s’ils se veulent compliqués sur le plan technique. Le chiffre de 3 000 milliards de dollars comme coût total nous apparaît juste et probablement plus bas que la réalité. Inutile de dire que ce total ne représente que le coût assumé par les États-Unis. Il ne reflète pas le coût énorme assumé par le reste du monde et l’Iraq» (Times online ). 

 

  Les coûts estimés de la reconstruction

 

En préparation de la réunion de pays donateurs de Madrid sur le projet de reconstruction de l’Irak en 2003 le total de 35.82 milliards de dollars a été estimé pour la période 2004-2007, le tout ayant été préparé par un comité conjoint formé par des représentants des Nations Unies et de la Banque mondiale.

 

Ce total de 36 milliards dollars en provenance des États-Unis seraient consacrés aux 14 secteurs d’intervention suivants: Institutions gouvernementales, éducation, santé, création d’emplois, transport et télécommunications, approvisionnement et assainissement des eaux et disposition des matières résiduelles, électricité, planification urbaine, logement et mise en valeur du territoire, agriculture et ressources en eau, entreprises de l’État, secteur financier, investissement dans la lutte contre les changements climatiques et action contre les mines. Les Autorités provisoires de la Coalition ont estimé qu’il fallait 20 milliards additionnels en incluant cinq milliards de dollars pour la sécurité et la police et 18 milliards pour les infrastructures de l’industrie pétrolière (Wikipedia).

 

 

Les déplacés et les réfugiés

 

Selon le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (UNCHR) la guerre en Irak à elle seule est responsable de 4.4 millions de réfugiés et de populations déplacées à l’intérieur des frontières (Global Voices online).

 

«La situation en Irak continue à empirer, avec plus de deux millions d’Irakiens dont on estime qu’ils ont été déplacés à l’intérieur des frontières et 2.2 millions qui ont cherché refuge dans les pays voisins » affirme le rapport de L’UNCHR».

 

«Selon des chiffres gouvernementaux, quelques 1.4 million d’Irakiens se trouvent maintenant en Syrie, jusqu’à 750 000 en Jordanie, 80 000 en Égypte et quelques 200 000 dans la région du Golfe. La Syrie, à elle seule, accueille un minimum de 30 000 Irakiens par mois» (Global Voices online). 

 

 

Conclusion

 

Ces guerres, comme on peut le constater, exercent, depuis le début du siècle, un impact majeur sur l’économie mondiale, car elles mobilisent des ressources matérielles et humaines considérables pour tuer et détruire, des ressources en provenance de l’ensemble de la planète. Elles créent un climat d’insécurité globale et provoquent, par le fait même, un puissant effet d’entraînement sur le réarmement d’un très grand nombre de pays avec des sommes colossales qui sont désormais engagées dans le processus de militarisation de continents tout entiers comme c’est le cas en Europe orientale et au Moyen Orient.

 

On peut le constater en analysant le taux de croissance des dépenses militaires mondiales. Depuis 1998 il a été constant et s’est avéré le net reflet de l’impact de ces guerres et celui du processus de réarmement global de la planète. Le total de ces dépenses, selon le Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), est passé de 735 milliards à 1339 milliards de dollars entre 1998 et 2007, soit une augmentation de 45% par rapport à 1998 (pour voir le tableau des dépenses militaires mondiales, cliquez ici)). Ce total correspond à 2.5% du produit mondial brut (PMB) et à la somme de $202.00 par personne (SIPRI, 2008).

 

Est-ce qu’une nouvelle administration à la Maison Blanche sera susceptible de stopper ce processus? Il est permis d’en douter, car les dividendes de ces guerres profitent grandement aux grandes industries d’armements et nous savons que celles-ci exercent une forte influence sur les orientations politiques et stratégiques des grandes puissances.

 

Un message clair a été prononcé par George Miller, membre du Congrès du District de Californie et président du comité de l’éducation et du travail. Ce message traduit bien les préoccupations d’un grand nombre d’Étatsuniens concernant la guerre en Irak: “Notre économie et notre pays ne peuvent continuer de supporter le coût de cette guerre, ni pour les soldats et leurs familles qui ont consenti d’énormes sacrifices pour notre pays». Miller ajouta: «Nous devrions reconstruire l’Amérique et non l’Irak, et nous devrions rétablir la force énorme pour le bien que l’Amérique peut accomplir pour la communauté internationale plutôt que de continuer de fragiliser la stabilité régionale et ternir notre réputation à l’étranger en poursuivant cette guerre tragique et inutile. Je presse le Président d’apporter son appui au programme de retrait de nos troupes de l’Irak» (Georgemiller.house).

 

Ces guerres sont loin d’être terminées selon Albert Legault, chercheur du Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité (CEPES) de Montréal: « Les guerres d’Irak et d’Afghanistan sont un désastre militaire, politique, économique, humanitaire et financier. En Irak, la situation militaire n’est pas plus stable qu’autrefois même si le nombre d’incidents violents a diminué –ce qui n’inclut pas les violents combats de Bassorah en mars 2008 et de Sadr Cité en avril – et de l’avis même des militaires américains, l’Afghanistan ne sera pas en mesure de s’occuper seule de sa sécurité avant 2013» (Er.uqam.ca).

 


Références

 

AP. Afghanistan: 9 soldats de l'Otan et 24 personnes tués. Le 13 juillet 2008. Adresse Internet: http://www.cyberpresse.ca/article/20080713/CPMONDE/80713063/1032/CPMONDE

 

AYAD, C. et M. Semo. 2008. Irak: bilan accablant pour une guerre de cinq ans. Le Quotidien Libération. Le 20 mars 2008. Adresse Internet: http://www.liberation.fr/actualite/monde/316691.FR.php

 

BELASCO, A. 2008. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11. CRS Report for Congress. Order Code RL33110. Updated June 23, 2008. Prepared for Members and Committes of Congress. 64 pages.

 

BORTOLASO, M.B. 2007. Usa, la facture de la guerre a doublé. Montréal, Centre de recherche sur la mondialisation. Le 16 novembre 2007. Adresse Internet: http://www.mondialisation.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7342

 

CHOSSUDOSKY, M. 2002. Guerre et mondialisation. La vérité derrière le 11 septembre. Montréal, écosociété. 256 pages.

 

CHOSSUDOVSKY, M. 2005. America’s “War on Terrorism”. Montréal, Global Research. 365 pages.

 

DOYLE, L. 2007. Trillion-dollar war: Afghanistan and Iraq set to cost more than Vietnam and Korea. Le 24 octobre 2007. Adresse Inernet:

http://www.casafree.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=7637

 

LEGAULT, A. 2008. La gestion post-Bush du chaos irakien et afghan. Le 8 avril 2008. Adresse Internet: http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/article-cepes.php3?id_article=4232

 

LEITENBERG, M. 2006. Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century. Cornell University, Peace Studies Program. Occasional Paper #29. 3nd ed. August 2006. 83 pages.

 

MEDDI, A. 2008. Combien de victimes civiles irakiennes tuées depuis 2003 ? Journal El Watan. Le 25 mars 2008. Adresse Internet:

http://www.elwatan.com/Combien-de-victimes-civiles

 

OXFORD RESEARCH GROUP. 2006. War on Terror' Failing, and Distracting Politicians from the Genuine Threats to Global Security : http://www.commondreams.org/news2006/0613-07.htm

 

STIGLITZ, J. et L. Bilmes. 2008. The three trillion dollar war

The cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have grown to staggering proportions. Le 23 février 2008.

Adresse Internet: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article3419840.ece

 

WHEELER, W.T. 2007. Which Side is the Pentagon On? The Costs of the Afghanistan War. Counterpunch. Le 29 août 2007.

Adresse Internet: http://www.counterpunch.org/wheeler08292007.html

 

 

Sites Internet

 

America’s War on Afghanistan / Matrix Masters:

http://www.matrixmasters.com/world/america/afghanistan/warafghanistan%20home.html

 

Actualité Mondiale : L'impossible bilan de la guerre en Irak:

http://www.casafree.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=7637

 

Civilian casualties of the War in Afghanistan (2001–present): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_casualties_of_the_War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29

 

"A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting"  and "A Day-to-Day Chronicle of Afghanistan's Guerrilla and Civil War, June 2003 - Present":

http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/

 

Guerre et Occupation en Irak / Résumé exécutif:

http://www.google.ca/search?hl=fr&q=Amnistie+internatinale+%2B+guerre+%2B+Irak&start=20&sa=N

 

International Peace Bureau: http://ipb.org/i/index.html

 

Iraq Body Count: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/

 

L’intervention américaine en Irak

Chronologie de la guerre en Irak (2002-2008). L’Express.fr :

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/proche-orient/chronologie-2002-2007_498027.html

 

Reconstruction in Iraq: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reconstruction_of_Iraq

 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): http://www.sipri.org/

 

The CNN Wire. New high for Afghanistan deaths. Le 26 juin 2008: http://cnnwire.blogs.cnn.com/2008/06/26/new-high-for-afghanistan-deaths/

 

Wars and armed conflicts:

 

List of wars and disasters by death toll:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_and_disasters_by_death_toll#Wars_and_armed_conflicts

 

War in Afghanistan (2001–present):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_(2001%E2%80%93present)#Civilians

 

War Victims Monitor: http://warvictims.wordpress.com/category/country/afghanistan/

 


  
Jules Dufour, Ph.D., est Professeur émérite à l'Université du Québec à Chicoutimi, Président de l'Association canadienne pour les Nations Unies (ACNU) /Section Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean,  Membre du cercle universel des Ambassadeurs de la Paix, Membre chevalier de l'Ordre national du Québec. Président du comité de coordination du Parc marin du Saguenay-Saint-Laurent et membre de la Commission des Aires protégées de l'Union mondiale de la nature (UICN). 


Jules Dufour est un collaborateur régulier de Mondialisation.ca.  Articles de Jules Dufour publiés par Mondialisation.ca
Communauté : Actualités Internationales - Publié dans : Iraq
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Jeudi 31 juillet 2008 4 31 /07 /2008 06:32


 

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July 27, 2008

In May 2003—some eight weeks after the American invasion had begun— Abdul-Amir Hamdani, the archaeology inspector of Dhi Qar province in southern Iraq, traveled to Najaf to call on the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. He had an urgent request. "We needed his help to stop the pillage," Hamdani recalled. The province, which is midway between Baghdad and Basra, covers much of what was once the land of Sumer. In the third millennium BC, it was a fertile plain densely populated by such cities as Ur, Lagash, Girsu, Larsa, and Umma; today, the shifting course of the Euphrates and Saddam Hussein’s brutal campaign to drain the marshes, to the southeast, have left it in large part an impoverished wasteland. With the fall of the Baathist regime, hundreds of poor farmers and villagers—often backed by armed militias—were turning to archaeological plunder; in some Dhi Qar towns, such as al-Fajr, the black market trade in antiquities was accounting for upward of 80 percent of the local economy.


Al-Sistani was sufficiently moved by Hamdani’s plea to pronounce a fatwa. He proclaimed that digging for antiquities is illegal; that both Islamic and pre-Islamic artifacts are part of Iraqi heritage; and that people who have antiquities in their possession should return them to the museum in Baghdad or in Nasiriya, the capital of Dhi Qar province. Copies of the fatwa were distributed widely in the south, and published in the Iraqi press. "At this point some of the looters stopped their work, because when Ayatollah al-Sistani says something, they listen," Hamdani said.


The fatwa was a small victory in what has been, for Hamdani, a largely intractable struggle to save one of the deep sources of human culture. Settling in the southern part of what the Greeks later called Mesopotamia some six thousand years before the birth of Christ, the Sumerians developed year-round cultivation, built the earliest city-states, and devised a complex system of writing. Over time, the area came under the sway of the Akkadians, the Babylonians, and the Assyrians; later, it fell under Persian and Hellenistic influence before the Islamic conquest in the seventh century. Left behind were the rich remains of history and literature, often in the form of baked mud-brick tablets covered with wedge-shaped script called cuneiform; and small engraved seals—cylinder-shaped objects made of imported hematite, lapis lazuli, and other semiprecious stones that, when rolled onto wet clay or other soft material, produce intricate and often stunningly beautiful impressions of ancient life and ritual.


Remote and mostly lacking in monumental architecture above ground, the buried cities in which this material was preserved withstood centuries of violence, from the arrival of Cyrus the Great in the sixth century BC to the Mongol invasion in 1258. An absence of much subsequent urban development also meant that the archaeological record was unusually clear. Yet since 2003, several important sites have been destroyed beyond recognition; perhaps tens of thousands of cylinder seals and cuneiform tablets have been removed and channeled into the underground art market.


"What is currently taking place in southern Iraq," Gil Stein, the director of the University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute, writes in the catalog to "Catastrophe!," the institute’s disturbing new exhibition on the subject, "is nothing less than the eradication of the material record of the world’s first urban, literate civilization." All the more remarkable, at a time of growing international concern for the devastating effects of archaeological plunder, the destruction of Sumer following the 2003 invasion was largely unchallenged by American and British forces. How did this happen?

1.

Since the looting of the Iraq Museum in Baghdad in April 2003, the international press has accorded considerable space to the country’s imperiled ancient heritage. Much of this coverage, however, has been devoted to the museum, the impressive campaign to recover its stolen works, and the continued struggle to reopen its galleries. (They remain closed.) Only occasional, anecdotal reports—mostly from the first year of the conflict—have borne witness to large-scale plunder of archaeological sites, to which the damage is irreversible.


In large part, the problem for journalists is the number of sites—there are over a thousand, many of them remote, in Dhi Qar province alone—and the danger posed by any attempt to investigate them. Micah Garen, a freelance filmmaker and photographer who, along with his partner Marie-Hélène Carleton, is perhaps the only Western journalist to have reported extensively on the looting in the south, was kidnapped by a gang with links to the Mahdi Army while visiting a black market in Nasiriya in 2004. He was held hostage for nine days, an ordeal recounted in Garen and Carleton’s recent memoir, American Hostage. The looters also have powerful connections that can intimidate their enemies: in early 2006, Hamdani was thrown into jail for three months on trumped-up charges after attempting to rein in the activities of a developer with close ties to the antiquities trade.


The dearth of firsthand accounts, in turn, has led to much confusion about the extent of the looting, its chronology, and its underlying causes. The destruction of sites, for example, has been blamed on everything from the Sunni insurgency and al-Qaeda in Iraq (also known as al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia) to treasure-hunting soldiers. The mystery has been heightened by the sense, among many in the art world, that remarkably little Iraqi material has been surfacing on the art market. Theories about the whereabouts of plundered objects have varied from storerooms in Damascus and Dubai to living rooms in the US and Japan.


This June, for the first time since 2003, a small group of archaeologists, led by John Curtis, curator of the Middle East collections at the British Museum, were able to visit eight major sites in southern Iraq in a helicopter provided by the British forces stationed in Basra. Their mission was limited—the eight sites were south of the region where looting has reportedly been heaviest. But at the sites they visited, they found that the digging was far from uniform. Uruk, Eridu, and Lagash suffered little or no looting; while Larsa and other sites had been extensively looted. "One shouldn’t underestimate the role that local people can play in this," Curtis told me after the trip. "No doubt that at Lagash, they were actively preventing looting. At other places, they might have been actively engaged in it."[1]


These new insights have been strengthened by an analysis of satellite images by Elizabeth Stone, an archaeologist at the State University of New York at Stony Brook who accompanied Curtis on the June survey. In the months preceding the 2003 invasion, DigitalGlobe Corporation, a Colorado company, began taking satellite photographs of southern Iraq for the Pentagon. Stone realized that these high-resolution images were particularly suited to documenting the mounds, or tells, of buried Mesopotamian cities, including any fresh digging and trenches. With support from the National Geographic Society, the National Endowment for Humanities, the State Department, and several other institutions, she began buying up the images, and by the time she published her findings earlier this year, she had data on nearly two thousand archaeological sites.[2]


As sheer documentation of knowledge destroyed, the pictures are chilling. Some of the most revealing discoveries about Mesopotamia—from the royal tombs at Ur to the literary texts of Nippur—have come from excavations in southern Iraq. And yet, Stone estimates that the total extent of the recent looting is


many times greater than all archaeological investigations ever conducted in southern Iraq—and must have yielded tablets, coins, cylinder seals, statues, terracottas, bronzes and other objects in the hundreds of thousands.[3]


And since these objects have been ripped from their archaeological settings, which in many cases have been destroyed, much of the potential information contained in them—even if they do resurface—has been obliterated.[4]


Still more striking, however, is what the satellite pictures tell us about the looters. First, despite the existence of important Mesopotamian sites throughout the country, intense, organized looting has occurred only in certain areas. Others who reported on the issue immediately following the invasion concluded that sites in the north had not been much targeted. But Stone is also able to show that some areas of southern Iraq, including Central Babylonia, to the south of Baghdad, and the Eridu Basin south of Nasiriya have remained largely intact; the heavy looting has been mostly confined to a sizable, but well defined, swath of territory around northwest Dhi Qar and the borderlands of its neighboring provinces—precisely the area where Hamdani has observed a booming antiquities trade.


Second, the images make clear that the first big wave of looting actually occurred before the arrival of Coalition forces. By the end of 2002, state authorities had largely abandoned the region of Sumer, along with other parts of the south, and photographs from early 2003 show evidence of rampant fresh digging at numerous small and medium-sized sites, many of them unstudied by archaeologists. Stone suggests that the timing of these initial excavations coincided with "the threat of hostilities—and presumably the mistaken expectation of increased security [by the US invaders] thereafter." Digging at some larger sites also began around this time, but seems to have accelerated greatly—and in more organized fashion—after the looting of Baghdad, in April and May 2003, when several of the most important known sites, including Isin and Umma, were largely destroyed. (At Isin the holes appear much blacker in the satellite images than at other sites, indicating deep trenches that reach down to the earliest stratum of human history there.[5] )


Finally, Stone is able to show with some precision that the hard-core looting, where it has occurred, has been selective. Prehistoric and early Bronze Age sites down to the time of Uruk—the first great city-state, where, in the early third millennium BC, the legendary Gilgamesh was king—were not much disturbed. Nor were the many sites in the region from the Neo-Babylonian period (630–539 BC) or from the Islamic era. In contrast, digging amounting to ransacking is evident at some sites dating from the Akkadian period (2335–2100 BC), when cylinder seals developed into an elaborate art form; there was also heavy looting at sites from the Old Babylonian era (2000–1600 BC), particularly known for its cuneiform tablets; and at sites from the centuries when the region was under Persian and Hellenistic influence (538 BC–637 AD), when works of glass and coins were in wide circulation.


What are we to make of these findings? For one thing, they bear out the observations of Iraqi archaeologists—and of the recent expedition led by John Curtis—that the people who have been involved at ground level belong to certain of the tribes native to Dhi Qar and neighboring provinces. Though underreported in the Western press, a system of tribes or khams has provided the backbone of rural Iraqi society for centuries. Until the first Gulf War, tribal hierarchies in the south were suppressed by the state, but they were increasingly reconstituted during the UN embargo of the 1990s, and tribal leaders have become a central source of authority in the vacuum of power since 2003. The area where heavy looting has occurred, for example, is largely under the control of a few tribes.


According to several archaeologists I spoke to, the support of their sheiks has been crucial to turning the plunder of artifacts from a criminal activity into what tribesmen now view as a legitimate form of income. A dealer in one of the market towns might pay five or ten dollars for small inscribed objects and fragments; a cylinder seal of particular beauty, or an intact cuneiform tablet, might get as much as fifty dollars—about half the monthly salary of an Iraqi civil servant. The dealers would in turn sell the objects to smugglers for many times their original value; by the time they reach the international art market, such objects could be worth four, five, or even six figures. Stone sculptures, which are relatively rare, might be worth far more.[6]


Tribes in the south often regard the ancient sites as part of their own land, and for some of them, these prices have made the harvesting of objects—from soil that is otherwise no longer arable —seemingly irresistible. "Most of the tribes approve of the looting," Donny George, the former director of the State Board of Antiquities, told me. (He was forced to leave Iraq in 2006 and is now a visiting professor at Stony Brook.) "And they control the towns where the antiquities trade is run."


That al-Sistani has been moved to intervene, moreover, suggests that some of those involved have attempted to use religious authority to give legitimacy to their digging. Behind the tribal activity in northwest Dhi Qar, then, is also a larger story about the fate of the Shiites—and the ancient land they inhabit—in the final years of Saddam’s Iraq.[7]


2.

In a 1979 speech, Saddam Hussein declared that "antiquities are the most precious relics the Iraqis possess, showing the world that our country…is the legitimate offspring of previous civilizations which offered a great contribution to humanity." Saddam’s heavy-handed efforts to turn Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar into forebears for Baathist expansionism are well known. (A better model might have been the Assyrian tyrant Assurnasirpal II, whose reign of terror in the ninth century BC included mass incinerations of the civilian populations he conquered.) Still, the Iraqi dictatorship maintained one of the more successful archaeology administrations in the Middle East. The State Board of Antiquities was well funded; several generations of Iraqi archaeologists worked closely with their Western counterparts at sites across Iraq; a large and flourishing museum establishment was developed; and site looting was virtually nonexistent. (Saddam would later decree that looting was punishable by death.)


In his informative recent book, Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation Building in Modern Iraq, Magnus T. Bernhardsson, a historian at Williams College, suggests that this privileging of Mesopotamian history was owed in part to the controversial legacy of the British Mandate in the 1920s. An important aim of British power in the region, he observes, was securing unfettered access to ancient sites, although Gertrude Bell’s farsighted policy of dividing the spoils with the Iraqi state made possible a remarkable era of archaeological discovery. It also helped bring the Mesopotamian heritage to the forefront of Iraqi politics, to the point that, by the 1970s, the Baathist regime could view the pre-Islamic past as a way to construct an Arab nationalist ideology that transcended sectarian differences that the regime violently suppressed. Amply funded by the oil boom, Sumerian and Babylonian sites in the south were for the most part carefully maintained, and, according to several archaeologists I spoke to who worked in Iraq at the time, were often a source of local pride.


All of this changed, however, with Saddam Hussein’s brutal crackdown on Shiites after the first Gulf War. During the 1991 uprisings that were encouraged by the US, Shiites (along with their Kurdish counterparts in the north) attacked and looted a number of regional state museums, which were associated with the regime. While archaeological sites were not immediately targeted in this way, Saddam’s ensuing punishment of the south—which destroyed the region’s fragile agricultural economy—had devastating effects. "Saddam was telling the people of southern Iraq, 'it’s not your civilization,’" Hamdani recalled. "And if it’s not your civilization, why protect it?"


Neglected sites in areas populated by impoverished farmers provided an opportunity for the international antiquities market. Together with small sculptures and Mesopotamian jewelry, cuneiform tablets or fragments containing mathematical or literary texts were attaining prices in the tens of thousands of dollars. Of even greater interest were cylinder seals, which had been actively pursued since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when J.P. Morgan had been a major buyer; in the 1990s, there were several international collectors acquiring them in large quantities. An auction of Near Eastern cylinder seals at Christie’s in 2001 netted close to $1.5 million, with top lots—such as a green serpentine seal, from the late third millennium, containing a remarkable depiction of bejeweled Akkadian deities; or an obsidian seal, from the thirteenth century BC, showing a Kassite aristocrat leading two restive horses—selling for well over $100,000.


By the mid-1990s, archaeologists were frequently identifying Iraqi material in auction catalogs and private galleries in London and New York, including clay tablets that, they said, clearly came from recent excavations at sites in Dhi Qar, such as Umma.[8] "It will forever be considered a marvel," the archaeologist John Russell writes in the catalog to "Catastrophe!," "that at the same time the United States was enforcing against Iraq the most rigorous sanctions regime in history…tens of thousands of previously undocumented Iraqi antiquities were sold openly on the US market."


The UN sanctions regime also made it possible for looters and smugglers to operate with impunity. "The no fly zone in the south of Iraq was essential to the trade," the archaeologist McGuire Gibson writes in The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq, a new volume of essays by different authors who have followed the crisis. "Without [Iraqi] helicopter surveillance, it was very difficult for the Iraqi authorities to control the countryside." Objects were leaving the country through Jordan, Syria, and Kurdistan, as well as the Gulf; most of the material was headed for the West.


In fact, this activity had begun to be brought under control in the years preceding the Iraq war. In 1999, with new funds from the UN Oil-for-Food Program, Iraq’s State Board of Antiquities began hiring local people to do year-round excavations at Umma and several other of the most vulnerable sites. The idea was that those formerly involved in looting could be trained to work as archaeologists—and given an alternative source of income. Donny George, who directed several of these excavations, told me that the looting did stop, and important recovery work was done. But as the Iraqi regime began to prepare for invasion in late 2002, the rescue excavations were shut down. Worse, there were now well-trained teams of local diggers who knew what to look for and where.

3.

In the weeks following the US-led invasion and the sacking of the Iraq Museum in April 2003, the international press began to report large-scale looting at several archaeological sites in southern Iraq. In late May, a front-page story in The New York Times described how the remains of the Sumerian city of Isin, northwest of Nasiriya, were being destroyed by "mobs of treasure hunters." The plunder was attributed to the general "anarchy and lawlessness" that followed the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime —a further instance of the looting that had occurred in Baghdad a few weeks earlier.


In fact, what appears to have been taking place at Isin was less anarchic rampage than an organized enterprise involving entire tribes and their communities. In another essay in The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq, Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly, a Lebanese journalist and archaeologist, describes her visit to a number of sites in the south in May 2003. "Dhi Qar," she writes, was under the total control of the looters and antiquities dealers. Heavily armed, they controlled the main roads leading to the biggest archaeological sites thereby providing security for their "employees." These were hundreds of farmers who had left behind their families to actually live on the sites and search for antiquities…. Their days started before sunrise for a few hours, and then the heat would force them to stop until late afternoon when a second shift would begin, continuing until late into the night. They were well equipped: they carried shovels and hammers, and they had made their own lamps run off car batteries.


Largely ignored by Coalition troops stationed in the south, this mass mobilization had created a new looting economy controlled by the tribal hierarchies and the dealers they worked with. Archaeologists who witnessed the looting in 2003 and 2004 have pointed out that they had to have the authorization of the local sheik even to gain access to a site. But there also was another important source of legitimacy for this former capital offense: the religious and sectarian parties the invasion had brought into power.


As was the case in the 1991 uprising, the looting of Baghdad in April 2003 was partly motivated by animosity toward the Saddam regime. Targets included ministries, office buildings, the houses of Baathist leaders, and official cars, as well as institutions like the Iraq Museum and, tragically, the National Library, which was looted and burned; and many of those involved were angry young Shiites from Sadr City. In his informative new account of the Sadrist movement, Patrick Cockburn, a veteran Iraq correspondent, describes Muqtada al-Sadr’s startling response to the mass looting of state property:


The looters became universally known in Iraq as al-Hawasim, meaning "the finalists." The term was a derisive reference to Saddam Hussein’s claim that an American invasion of Iraq would provoke "a final battle." In May, Muqtada issued what became known as the al-Hawasim fatwa, saying that looters could hold on to what they had expropriated so long as they made a donation (khums) of one-fifth of its value to their local Sadrist office.


It remains unclear whether there were explicit edicts along these lines in reference to archaeological sites. But Iraqi officials I spoke to say that local religious leaders affiliated with the Sadrist movement have condoned the antiquities trade insofar as it produces funds and does not—in theory—involve Islamic material. "Some of the followers of Sadr were writing on banners at some of the archaeological sites that [Muqtada] does not stop anyone from looting if they would sell [the looted objects] to get weapons or build a mosque," Donny George told me. For Hamdani, it became clear that to change the local plunder economy, he would need the tribal and religious authorities on his side. He cultivated ties to the sheiks; he began visiting mosques in the principal black market towns, to try to get the message out in Friday sermons; and then he decided to call on the Ayatollah al-Sistani himself.


Since many poor Shiites in the south are not followers of al-Sistani, his fatwa against looting did not solve the problem. But it did result in a remarkable breakthrough: a looter who had been moved by al-Sistani’s order contacted the museum in Nasiriya, where Hamdani was stationed. "He told me he had a lot of information about the smugglers and the black market," Hamdani said. Hamdani gave him a digital camera and a Global Positioning System device that looked like a cell phone and sent him back to work. He became a key informant for the State Board of Antiquities, providing photographs and locations about diggers and the people who hired them. With the help of Italian forces then stationed in the south, dozens of arrests were made, and hundreds of antiquities were recovered. But the Italians left in 2006, leaving unanswered a more perplexing question: Where was all the looted material going?


4.

In late January, I was taken to a large warehouse in East Amman, the working-class part of the Jordanian capital that has absorbed tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees since the war began. The warehouse was owned by the Jordanian Department of Antiquities, and it was full of Iraqi materials: Aramaic incantation bowls, Akkadian seals, Old Babylonian agricultural records, stone sculptures, Sassanian glass, Parthian jewelry, Roman and Islamic coins, and other antiquities— some of them marked with labels from the Iraq Museum in Baghdad.[9]


Along with other neighboring states, Jordan is frequently mentioned as one of the principal gateways for illicit archaeological material from Iraq, and these objects, confiscated by Jordanian officials in only a handful of seizures, give some idea of the extent of the cross-border trade in looted cultural property. (Saad Eskander, the director of the Iraq National Library and Archive, who has spent the last five years rebuilding this institution in war-torn Baghdad, told me that he had been contacted by a person in Amman who claimed to have some important documents stolen from its holdings. He wanted to sell them back to the library for $50,000.)


Yet perhaps most interesting about the artifacts in the warehouse was their variable quality. Among some important pieces, there was a lot of junk, and the Jordanian archaeologist who accompanied me suggested that a number of the artifacts were modern fakes. Most had been confiscated in the months immediately following the invasion, and some of them appear to have been in possession of everyday refugees who had little sense of their value. Fawwaz al-Khraysheh, the director of the Jordanian Department of Antiquities, told me that no major seizures of looted artifacts have occurred since 2004.


Several people who are familiar with the antiquities market in the region suggest that larger smugglers are not working through Jordan, which is relatively far from the principal area of looting and which, together with Syria, has cooperated with Iraq on policing antiquities theft. (In late April, Syria returned to Iraq some seven hundred antiquities confiscated since 2003; in June, Jordan returned more than two thousand objects, including those I had seen in Amman.) Rather, the principal smuggling routes appear to be across the Iranian and other southern borders, to the Persian Gulf, where the material might be "warehoused" for a number of years, or privately sold with few questions asked.


As the Persian Gulf states, funded by the oil boom, have become Middle East trade hubs, they have also quickly developed into centers of art and antiquities collecting. According to a cuneiform scholar I spoke to with extensive contacts in the Middle East, a prominent Kuwaiti sheik has amassed a large collection of Mesopotamian artifacts, including much recently looted material from Iraq. Another destination may be Israel. The country is known for its liberal approach to the antiquities trade; one American curator told me it is possible to buy "virtually anything" in Jerusalem’s old markets. In September 2005, Israeli officials seized a container full of looted Iraqi artifacts at the airport in Tel Aviv. The Israeli press reported that it had passed through Dubai and London, and was the largest such seizure in Israeli history.


Iraqis themselves suggest that the most plausible smuggling routes have been through Iran and Kurdistan. Donny George observes that the governments of Iran and Turkey have until now demonstrated little interest in policing their borders for antiquities smugglers, and Kurdish and Iranian dealers are believed to be involved in the trade. Since the 2003 invasion, moreover, large numbers of Iranians have been making pilgrimages to Najaf, Karbala, and other Shiite holy sites, creating cross-border traffic that facilitates smuggling.


Some of this material has already reached Western shores. Since 2003, Britain and the United States have had bans in force against trading in recently surfaced Iraqi antiquities, and unlike during the 1990s there have not been large auctions featuring cuneiform tablets and other Mesopotamian material. Even eBay has taken measures to prevent trading in looted artifacts.[10] Yet newly surfaced Iraqi material—in particular objects of lower and middle value—has been traded on the Internet, through smaller on-line auction and gallery sites. In recent Google searches, I found several Web sites that sell foundation cones—small cone-shaped objects covered with dedicatory inscriptions that were embedded in the walls of important buildings in the third and early second millennia—and other cuneiform artifacts for prices ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. Some are identified as coming from particular sites in "Southern Mesopotamia."


5.

For several years now, archaeologists and cultural property specialists, as well as nongovernment groups such as UNESCO and the World Monuments Fund (which in 2006 took the unprecedented step of putting Iraq as an entire country on its list of most endangered sites), have been voicing alarm about the rapid destruction of Iraq’s ancient past. These efforts, many of which are documented in a new collection of policy-minded essays, Antiquities Under Siege, have done much to keep this neglected aspect of the Iraq crisis in view. They have also underlined the failures of US and British forces to plan for—and, after the invasion, to provide—even basic protection of archaeological sites.


Yet in reading these essays, one often senses a detachment from the reality of what has been happening in Iraq. Since the bombing of the Samarra mosque in early 2006—itself a terrifying indication of the degree to which cultural monuments have become part of the war—foreign cultural officials have largely avoided travel outside of the main cities and military bases. UNESCO’s Iraq office, for example, has for some time occupied a temporary facility in Amman; when I visited officials there early this year, I was told that travel to Iraq had been strictly limited for security reasons.


In Baghdad, meanwhile, the cultural administration has suffered from larger power struggles within the Iraqi government. In 2006, the State Board of Antiquities was subsumed into a new Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, which has been controlled by the Sadrist bloc in parliament. The ministry has shown little interest in providing resources for site protection, and "tourism" appears to refer mainly to pilgrimages to Islamic shrines. By late 2007, there was very little fuel available to gas up the trucks that had been supplied by a private American foundation and by UNESCO for Iraqi patrols of archaeological sites.


Today, there are signs that the worst looting may be over. To the extent that the excavations have produced the quantity of material estimated by Elizabeth Stone, the underground market has surely been saturated by now, bringing down prices. Stone and John Curtis also found that none of the eight sites they visited with British forces in June had been looted since the immediate aftermath of the invasion. Indeed, some of the damage discovered by the British expedition was a result not of looting, but of defensive positions that appear to have been dug by the Iraqi army shortly before the US-led invasion. In the case of Ur, the site has been protected from looting by an adjacent military air base, but has suffered degradation from the thousands of Coalition troops who until recently had open access to it. (A more shocking case of site damage by Coalition forces occurred in 2004 at Babylon, as documented by Zainab Bahrani, a scholar of Near Eastern art and archaeology at Columbia University.[11] )


Of course, these findings provide scant consolation for what appears to have been one of the most concentrated and devastating episodes of archaeological destruction in modern history. In The Buried Book, his recent account of the rediscovery of The Epic of Gilgamesh, David Damrosch observes that the poem portrays Gilgamesh as one of the great kings of Sumer by emphasizing his accomplishments as "custodian of ancient cities and monuments that have to be maintained and repaired." Indeed, in the prologue of the epic, the poet describes the story he is about to tell as an artifact of the past, to be discovered—as in fact it was by archaeologists in the nineteenth century—and carefully preserved:


[See] the tablet-box of cedar
[release] its clasp of bronze.

[Lift] the lid of its secret
[pick] up the tablet of lapis lazuli and read out
the travails of Gilgamesh, all that he went through…

The example of Gilgamesh was forgotten in 2003, and we may never know how many other such "secrets" have been lost as a result.

—July 15, 2008

Notes


[1] Citing the June survey, recent reports in The Art Newspaper and The Wall Street Journal have somewhat breathlessly suggested that little or no looting in southern Iraq actually occurred. To the contrary, the findings provide further evidence that organized plunder was both extensive and selective, bearing out earlier indications that some large sites were not affected. For a formal report on the eight sites inspected in the survey, see www.britishmuseum.org/iraq.


[2] Elizabeth C. Stone, "Patterns of Looting in Southern Iraq," Antiquity, Vol. 82 (Spring 2008), pp. 125–138. A less technical account of her findings is contained in her essay in the catalog to "Catastrophe!"


[3] It should be stressed that until further information comes to light, any attempt to quantify the number of objects removed is by nature conjectural. The number of cuneiform texts that have surfaced in the West remains small, although anecdotal evidence indicates that far larger quantities may be in the Middle East or elsewhere. Thousands of cylinder seals remain at large from the Iraq Museum alone, and the extent of the looting holes and the number of sites involved give some weight to a number well into the tens of thousands, if not higher.


[4] It has been observed that archaeological "context" may matter less for inscribed objects, whose own texts contain important historical information and often identify where they are from. Mesopotamian texts have frequently been found together, however, in buried libraries or collections of tablets, the existence of which has made it possible to use texts to draw broad conclusions about politics, culture, and daily life. Once texts from such a group are dispersed it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct that group and its significance. I am grateful to Piotr Michalowski for this point.


[5] For a study of the damage at Isin and its surrounding area using similar techniques as Professor Stone’s, see Carrie Hritz, "Remote Sensing of Cultural Heritage in Iraq: A Case Study of Isin," in TAARII Newsletter, The American Academic Research Institute in Iraq, Spring 2008, available at www.taarii.org/newsletters/.


[6] In December 2007 a three-and-a-half- inch limestone Standing Lioness Demon, dating from the beginning of the third millennium and said to be found near Baghdad in the early twentieth century, sold at Sotheby’s for $57 million, an auction record for an antiquity or piece of sculpture.


[7] Notwithstanding claims made in the press, a direct connection between the plunder and Sunni insurgent groups appears unlikely, according to Iraqi officials I spoke to and to archaeologists who have studied the satellite evidence.


[8] The attraction of Umma, a city of great importance in the late third millennium, can be attributed to environmental factors as well. Covered by dunes for many decades, it had been inaccessible to archaeologists; but the shifting sands exposed it again by the 1990s, and it quickly became known among looters, as it had been early in the twentieth century, for its cuneiform tablets from the Ur III period. Around 20,000 tablets have been published from the site. I am grateful to Robert K. Englund for this point.


[9] Many of these works were helpfully catalogued by a research team from the Center for Archaeological Research and Excavations in Turin. See An Endangered Cultural Heritage: Iraqi Antiquities Recovered in Jordan, edited by Roberta Menegazzi (Florence: Le Lettere, 2005).


[10] In August 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the UN mandated general sanctions on goods from Iraq. It was not until the second Iraq War, however, that legislation specific to Iraqi cultural property was enacted in the United States. In May 2003 the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for the return of cultural goods to Iraq and the prohibition of trade in such items. In 2004, the US Congress passed the Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act, which allows the president to impose restrictions on the import of any artifacts illegally removed from Iraq after August 1990.


[11] Professor Bahrani, at the time an adviser to the Iraq Ministry of Culture stationed at Babylon, published her findings in "Days of Plunder," The Guardian, August 31, 2004. See also the British Museum report on Babylon by John Curtis, who concludes that the site suffered "substantial damage" as a result of its occupation by Coalition forces.



BOOKS MENTIONED IN THIS ARTICLE

  • Catastrophe! The Looting and Destruction of Iraq’s Past, an exhibition at the Oriental Institute Museum, Chicago, April 10–December 31, 2008. Catalog of the exhibition edited by Geoff Emberling and Katharyn Hanson.
  • The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq, edited by Peter G. Stone and Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly
  • Antiquities Under Siege: Cultural Heritage Protection After the Iraq War, edited by Lawrence Rothfield
  • Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq, by Patrick Cockburn
  • Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation Building in Modern Iraq, by Magnus T. Bernhardsson
  • The Buried Book: The Loss and Rediscovery of the Epic of Gilgamesh, by David Damrosch
  • American Hostage, by Micah Garen and Marie-Hélène Carleton


:: Article nr. 46013 sent on 28-jul-2008 07:05 ECT
www.uruknet.info?p=46013

Link: www.nybooks.com/articles/21671
Communauté : Actualités Internationales - Publié dans : Iraq
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